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In Chapter 1 I study the iterative strategy elimination mechanisms for normal
form games. The literature is mostly clustered around the order of elimination.
The conventional elimination also requires more strict knowledge assumptions if
the elimination is iterative. I define an elimination process which requires weaker
rationality. I establish some preliminary results suggesting that my mechanism is
order independent whenever iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies
(IEWDS) is so. I also specify conditions under which the “undercutting problem”
occurs. Comparison of other elimination mechanisms in the literature (Iterated
Weak Strategy Elimination, Iterated Strict Strategy Elimination, Generalized
Strategy Eliminability Criterion, RBEU, Dekel-Fudenberg Procedure, Asheim-
Dufwenberg Procedure) and mine is also studied to some extent. In Chapter 2
I study the axiomatic characterization of a well-known bankruptcy rule: Pro-
portional Division (PROP). The rule allocates shares proportional to agents’
claims and hence, is intuitive according to many authors. I give supporting
evidence to this opinion by first defining a new type of consistency requirement,
i.e. union−consistency and showing that PROP is the only rule that satisfies
anonymity, continuity and union−consistency. Note that anonymity and conti-
nuity are very general requirements and satisfied by almost all the rules that have
been studied in this literature. Thus, I prove that we can choose a unique rule
among them by only requiring union−consistency. Then, I define a bankruptcy
operator and give some intuition on it. A bankruptcy operator is a mapping from
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the set of bankruptcy operators to itself. I prove that any rule will converge to
PROP under this operator as the claims increase. I show nice characteristics of
the operator some of which are related to PROP. I also give a definition for con-
tinuity of an operator. In Chapter 3 investigate risk-averse investors’ behaviour
towards a risky firm. In order to find Pareto Optimal allocations regarding a joint
venture, I employ a 2-stage game, first stage of which involves a social-planner
committing to an ex-post bankruptcy rule. A bankruptcy rule is a set of sug-
gestions for solving each possible bankruptcy problem. A bankruptcy problem
occurs when there is not enough endowment to allocate to the agents each of
whom has a claim on it. I devise the game-theoretic approach posed in Kıbrıs
and Kıbrıs (2013) and extend it further. In fact, that paper considers a compar-
ison among 4 renowned bankruptcy rules whereas mine do not restrict attention
to any particular rule but rather aim to find a Pareto Optimal(PO) one. I start
with 2 agent case in order to give some insight to the reader and then, generalise
the results to an arbitrary number of investors. I find socially desirable (PO)
allocations and show that the same can be achieved through financial markets by
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Chapter 1
Iterative Elimination with Recall
1.1 Motivation and Literature Review
As is well known, the most widely studied and probably the most important is-
sue in game theory is that of making predictions about outcomes of games or at
least making predictions about payoffs that might be obtained, to the extent that
the predictions about the outcomes allow. Broadly speaking, one can consider
two main approaches used in the literature regarding this endeavor. The first
approach, which is also widely used in other disciplines such as evolutionary bi-
ology, computer science and political science, involves the well-known concept of
”equilibrium”, which prescribes strategy profiles that might emerge as outcomes.
The second approach are iterative methods in which unanticipated strategies are
removed from consideration. Such methods focus on which strategies cannot be
played rather than which can be played. In both approaches, the state of knowl-
edge the players are in and their ability to use reason and deduce from others’
reasonings, play an important role. There is, however, a significant difference
between the two approaches in terms of how they use internally consistent belief
systems. Nash equilibrium assumes certain restrictions on agents’ expectations
and argues that agents will expect others to play equilibrium strategies in order
to justify the outcomes it suggests. By contrast, iterative methods are concerned
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with making predictions using rationality alone. Bernheim (1984) says that
”. . . the notion of an equilibrium has little intrinsic appeal within a strate-
gic context. When an agent reaches a decision in ignorance of the strategies
adopted by other players, rationality consists of making a choice which is
justifiable by an internally consistent system of beliefs, rather than one
which is optimal, post hoc. This point of view is not original; indeed, most
serious justifications of the Nash hypothesis embrace such an approach,
arguing that agents will expect the game to yield a Nash outcome, and
consequently will choose their equilibrium strategies. Nevertheless, when
we think in terms of maximizing utility subject to expectations rather than
realizations, it becomes clear that the Nash hypothesis, far from being a
consequence of rationality, arises from certain restrictions on agents’ ex-
pectations which may or may not be plausible, depending upon the game
being played. We are then quite naturally led to ask: are there any restric-
tions of individuals’ expectations (and hence choices) which are required
by rationality alone, rather than by (subjective) plausibility?”
The most common assumption is that the players use a common criterion
when throwing strategies out, and that this criterion is common knowledge. Strict
dominance and weak dominance are at the core of such possible criteria. Although
the term ”dominance solvability” is coined by Moulin (1979), the tradition of
using such criteria dates back to Luce and Raiffa (1957), and is also used as early
as Farquharson (1969) to study voting schemes.
Using such criteria for eliminating strategies and assuming common knowl-
edge may lead to further eliminations as each player will also take into account
which strategies her opponents will eliminate, and as a consequence which strate-
gies of her own will become ”eligible” for elimination. However, the players may
iterate different sequences of reasoning and draw conclusions that do not agree
with each other. Nevertheless, it is commonly known that iterated elimination
of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) results in a unique set of strategies in a
finite normal form game. Moreover, Moulin (1984) shows that the same applies
to Cournot duopoly, i.e., only the Nash equilibrium remains in a Cournot game
after sequential elimination of different levels of output. In addition, Dufwenberg
and Stegeman (2002) prove that IESDS may be an order-dependent procedure
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when strategy spaces larger than finite sets are considered, and that it may gen-
erate spurious Nash equilibria. They also establish that if the strategy spaces are
compact in Hausdorff spaces and the payoff functions are upper semi-continuous,
IEWDS succeeds in yielding a prediction, whereas it is not the case in most of
the larger classes of games. They prove an order-independence result for IESDS
under such a class of games. Additionally, they establish that when the players
have well-defined best-response correspondences, IESDS preserves Nash equilib-
ria. Gilboa et al. (1990) establish sufficient conditions for order-independence
for various types of eliminations and show that IESDS satisfy them in finite
normal-form games.
On the other hand, the conditions in Gilboa et al. (1990) are not satisfied by
iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS). This is why things
are not as straightforward when it comes to IEWDS as the order-independence
problem persists even if we restrict attention to finite normal-form games. Be-
sides, there has been a long discussion on whether the knowledge of not playing
weakly dominated strategies automatically leads to IEWDS. Samuelson (1992)
argues that the answer to this question is “no”. He proves that common knowl-
edge does not guarantee order-independence, nor does it guarantee a solution to
the players. Hillas and Samet (2014b) write:
”Despite the awareness of the problem, no suggestion has been made how
to fix the process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies in
order to capture common knowledge of weak dominance rationality, due to
the lack of formalization of weak dominance rationality”.
They show that when it is common knowledge that the players do not play
weakly dominated strategies, they must play profiles that survive flaws of the
weakly dominated strategies process, which is described by Stalnaker (1994).
Hillas and Samet (2014a) establish weak/strong non-probabilistic correlated equi-
librium which suggests typically a collection of profiles as it can be perceived in the
fashion of correlated equilibrium defined in Aumann (1974).Aumann (1987)em-
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ploys common knowledge of Bayesian rationality and assumes that beliefs are
derived from a common prior. Unlike his paper, Hillas and Samet (2014a) use
weak/strong rationality. A player is weakly rational if she does not play strictly
dominated strategies, and strongly rational if she does not play weakly dominated
strategies.
Besides defining the concept of dominance solvability, Moulin (1979) also uses
it to show that some important classes of voting games are dominance solvable.
A game is said to be dominance solvable if all outcomes obtained by apply-
ing IEWDS yield the same payoff profile. Mariotti (2000) defines ”maximum
games” and shows that they are dominance solvable. He also establishes that
an important subclass of such games is dominance solvable on the unique Pareto
dominant outcome. Ewerhart (2002) proves that any 2-person strictly competi-
tive game with n outcomes is solvable in (n − 1) stages of IEWDS. Kukushkin
(2012) studies dominance solvability and best-response dominance solvability in
finite games. Börgers and Janssen (1995) establish a condition which is necessary
and sufficient for a Cournot game to be dominance solvable.
The reason why common knowledge of players’ rationality does not directly
justify IEWDS, is that the principle of rationality is not fully applied. In other
words, the strategies that were weakly dominated in some stage of elimination,
may become weakly undominated later on. There are numerous solutions offered
in order to deal with this issue. One such solution is the reasoning based expected
utility procedure (RBEU), suggested by Cubitt and Sugden (2011). RBEU comes
to a halt, producing a trinary partition of strategies, and this provides a partial
answer to the question of order-independence and full employment of common
rationality. Unlike many other procedures, RBEU generates a trinary partition
as there remains a category of strategies about which the mechanism does not
make any definite assertions. Nevertheless, it provides a reasoning procedure
which removes mutually inconsistent conclusions that may be held by different
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players.
An alternative approach is chosen by Börgers (1994) by replacing common
knowledge of rationality with ”approximate common knowledge” which is dis-
cussed by Monderer and Samet (1989) and Stinchcombe (1988). Using this ap-
proach, he justifies the procedure introduced by Dekel and Fudenberg (1990).The
Dekel and Fudenberg procedure utilises maximal elimination of weakly dominated
strategies at the first stage, and then continues with IESDS.Cheng and Wellman
(2007) study a modified version of IEWDS. They weaken the weak dominance
condition and allow a more aggressive pruning of strategies, and also show some
important implications of this technique regarding the equilibria that survive it-
erated elimination. As with many other papers in the literature, they consider
elimination by mixed strategies but impose a condition which does not permit
a strategy si to be eliminated by a mixture that also includes si. They define
δ−dominance such that a mixed strategy σi can eliminate a pure strategy si al-
though it yields payoffs lower by δ against some opponent profiles. In some sense,
σi can be said to approximately weakly dominate si. They also establish that the
equilibria of a game obtained by iteratively eliminating δ−dominated strategies
will be approximate equilibria of the original game. Unfortunately, their proce-
dure is order-dependent, and the approximate equilibria that survive depend on
the order of elimination as well.
The closest procedure to ours in the literature is Asheim and Dufwenberg
(2003).They define fully permissible strategy sets using an algorithm that elimi-
nates subsets of the entire strategy set. In the procedure they establish, players
treat sets of strategies as choice sets. Their work relies on the assumption that
players hold a common belief that each player prefers si to ti if and only if si
weakly dominates ti on the set of the opponent’s strategies, or on the union of
choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. This assumption con-
structs a link between the strategies that survive up to some stage of elimination
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and the entire set. Notice that in a given stage, a strategy which is not weakly
dominated on the set of the opponent’s strategies that also survive until that
stage, may be eliminated due to being weakly dominated when the entire set is
considered. In the present paper, we show that such an ad hoc assumption is not
necessary in an important class of games. That is, once this condition on choice
sets is removed, the Asheim and Dufwenberg procedure produces the same results
as ours. However, while they prove their findings for the 2-player case only, we
allow for an arbitrary number of players. In other words, we show that EWR is
well defined in TDI games and produces the same admissible set of strategies as
IEWDS.
It is noteworthy that although many of the papers above consider elimination
by mixed strategies, Marx and Swinkels (1997), which is the results-wise closest
paper to ours, also considers elimination by pure strategies alone. The following
example demonstrates that allowing elimination by mixtures may have an effect
on which strategies should be eliminated.
Example 1.
U M D
L ., 10 ., 0 ., 0
R ., 0 ., 4 ., 10
In the example above, although M is not weakly dominated by either U or
D, it is so by the mixture (U, 0.5;D, 0.5) where both U and D are played with
probability 0.5. We also know that if a pure strategy si yields a higher payoff than
a mixed strategy σi against some mixed opponent profile σ−i, then σ−i assigns
positive probability to a pure strategy sj against which si generates a higher
payoff than σi. That is why weak domination against mixtures does not increase
the chance of a strategy being recalled, an operation we define in the following
section. However, as the effect of deletion of an opponent’s strategy on one’s
own strategies is uncertain, we are far from making any statements on whether
allowing mixtures will make our procedure stronger or not.
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1.2 Model
Let I = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players. A typical strategy of player i is denoted
by si. Let Si be the finite set of strategies that are available to player i. A strategy
profile is a vector which is an ordered collection of strategies denoted by s =
(s1, s2, ..., sn) whose ith component shows si of i. S = ×i∈ISi is the set of strategy
profiles. πi : S → R is the payoff function of player i. The structure of the game is
common knowledge and each player is assumed to be rational. Furthermore, we
are interested in games where rationality of agents is also common knowledge(so
that iterative reasoning applies). Π = (π1, π2, ..., πn) is the payoff function. A
finite normal-form game is an ordered tuple Γ = (I, S,Π).
By s−i, π−i we will denote the strategy profile and payoff functions of the oppo-
nents’ of player i, respectively. S−i = ×j 6=iSj and Π−i = (π1, π2, ...πi−1, πi+1, ..., πn)
will denote the set of strategy profiles and payoff functions of i’s opponents, re-
spectively. Let Φ =
⋃
i∈I Si and W ⊆ Φ. W is said to be a restriction of Φ if
it includes at least one strategy of each player, i.e., W ∩ Si 6= ∅ for each i ∈ I.
The strategies in a given restriction W of Φ that belong to player i are denoted
by Wi = W ∩ Si. The set of strategy profiles that can be constructed by using
strategies in a restriction W are given by Sw = ×i∈IWi, with a typical element
represented by sw ∈ Sw. We will denote by swi ∈ Wi player i’s strategy in sw.
We need to make the distinction between W and s, as W might include more
than one strategy of any agent and it does not pair up a player’s strategies with
the strategies of her opponents.
Definition 1. i) For any ti, si ∈ Si, ti strictly dominates si on W−i, if we have
πi(ti, s
w
−i) > πi(si, s
w
−i) for all s
w
−i ∈ Sw−i..
ii) For any ti, si ∈ Si, ti weakly dominates si on W−i, if we have πi(ti, sw−i) ≥
πi(si, s
w
−i) for all s
w
−i ∈ Sw−i and πi(ti, z−i) > πi(si, z−i) for some z−i ∈ Swi .
The exercise of eliminating weakly dominated strategies is performed at the
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thought level and does not involve any commitment. It is merely a process of
reasoning. Therefore, the players are not bound by the remaining strategies but
rather benefit from not playing them as a consequence of their rationality. Once
the players eliminate weakly dominated strategies, they face a similar situation:
A new game possibly comprising strategies which became weakly dominated after
the first stage of elimination. It is natural to expect the other players to follow a
similar approach. Thus, the same reasoning will apply iteratively until no weakly
dominated strategy remains. As there is more than one path of elimination, in
order for the players to reach a final set of surviving strategies, some coherency
among the reasoning of the players is required. One may argue that in order to
further proceed with the iterative elimination, a player needs to be certain about
which strategies are deleted in the previous stages by his opponents so that he
can adequately choose strategies to delete at that stage. Although there might
be more than one path of elimination and the player cannot know which one to
follow, she can work out the resulting ”reduced game” of each path and still act
if all paths lead to the survival of the same strategies. If she knows that it is the
unique reduced game regardless of the elimination path followed and that other
players work it out too, and others also know that each player works out the same
outcome and so on, the deletion occurs just as it does when there is a single path.
Hence, what matters is the reduced game. With regard to this point, Gretlein
(1983) proves order independence of elimination paths for games where players
have strict preferences over the outcomes. In such games, given her opponents’
strategy vector, a player can be indifferent between two strategies only if both
result in the same outcome. Rochet (1980) identifies a class of games which also
satisfy order independence, namely, any finite normal form game with a payoff
matrix that satisfies the following condition:
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πi(s) = πi(t) =⇒ πj(s) = πj(t) for all i, j ∈ I and for all s, t ∈ S.
Marx and Swinkels (1997)) prove order independence for a wider class of
games, games that satisfy transference of decision maker indifference (TDI).
Definition 2. A normal form game Γ = (I, S,Π) satisfies TDI if we have for all
i,∈ I , ri, ti ∈ Si and s−i ∈ S−i;
πi(ri, s−i) = πi(ti, s−i) =⇒ πj(ri, s−i) = πj(ti, s−i)
Note that Marx and Swinkels (1997) extend their results to mixed strategies
as well.TDI is very similar to non-bossiness condition in social choice. Basically, it
states that, given a strategy profile, no player should be able to change some other
player‘s payoff without changing his own payoff by playing a different strategy.
Marx and Swinkels (1997) provide many examples that satisfy TDI including
patent races, oligopoly with an endogenous number of firms, first price auctions,
public good provision games etc. We take the following definition from Marx and
Swinkels (1997).
Definition 3. Let V be a restriction of Φ and let W be a restriction of V. Then,
W is a reduction of V by weak dominance if W = V \X1, X2, ..., Xm where ∀k,
Xk ⊂ Φ and ∀xi ∈ Xk, ∃zi ∈ V \X1i , ..., Xki such that zi weakly dominates xi on
V \X1−i, ..., Xk−i. W is a full reduction of V by weak dominance if W is a reduction
of V by weak dominance and no strategies in Wi are weakly dominated on W−i
for all i ∈ I.
The above definition is saying that a set is a reduction of its superset only if
the difference consists of strategies that were weakly dominated on the superset.
In other words, in order to obtain a reduction of a set, either some of the weakly
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dominated strategies should be removed or the set should remain the same. As
opposed to EWR new strategies cannot be added. Nor can strategies that are
not weakly dominated be eliminated. Note that according to the definition above,
a reduction of Φ is also a reduction of itself. Below is the definition from Hillas
and Samet (2014b) which is equivalent.
Definition 4. A process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies
consists of sequences of strategy profile sets (S0, S1, ..., Sm), where S0 = S, and
for k ≥ 1, Sk = ×iSki where Ski is obtained from Sk−1i by eliminating some
strategies in the latter set which are weakly dominated relative to Sk−1−i . In the
sets Smi there are no weakly dominated strategies relative to S
m
−i.
Next we define iterated elimination with recall (hereafter EWR).
Definition 5. Let Ψ be a restriction of Φ. A process of EWR is a sequence of
restrictions (Ψ0,Ψ1, ...,Ψm) such that Ψ0 = Ψ and for k ∈ {1, ...,m} ∀ zi ∈
Ψk−1i \Ψki , ∃ xi ∈ Ψki where xi weakly dominates zi on Ψk−1−i , ∀zi ∈ Ψki /Ψk−1i , @
xi ∈ Ψki ∩ Ψk−1−i where xi weakly dominates zi on Ψk−i ∩ Ψk−1−i and ∀ zi ∈ Ψ\Ψm,
∃ xi ∈ Ψmi such that xi weakly dominates zi on Ψm−i. In the sets Ψmi there are no
weakly dominated strategies relative to Ψm−i.
Unlike IEWDS, the size of the set does not necessarily shrink at each step.
At each EWR stage, first some of the weakly dominated strategies are eliminated.
Then, before proceeding to the next stage, some of the previously removed strate-
gies are recalled back if they are not weakly dominated with respect to the new
set. Notice that a strategy which became weakly undominated after some strate-
gies are deleted, does not have to be recalled right away. On the other hand,
a strategy which is recalled has to be weakly undominated with respect to the
new set obtained after the deletion. This process goes on until there is no weakly
dominated strategy left to eliminate and no strategy to recall. Regarding the ex-
tent to which rationality and common knowledge of rationality assumptions are
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employed, we can consider EWR as a criticism of iterated elimination of weakly
dominated strategies (hereafter IEWDS). Since a player’s opponents’ strategies
are also going through the process of elimination in IEWDS, some of his strate-
gies which were eliminated at previous stages might become undominated. As
applying rationality does not exclude such strategies from being played, his op-
ponents need to consider them valid while further iterating the elimination. Also
when deleting strategies at following stages, the player knows that his opponents
consider such strategies of his admissible and then, the same kind of iterated logic




a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
b1 5, 0 5, 1 3, 6 4, 1, 2, 6
b2 3, 1 2, 2 3, 7 3, 0 2, 0
The game has 3 Nash Equilibria (NE) and these are (a3, b1), (a3, b2), (a5, b1).
A possible path of IEWDS is eliminating all weakly dominated strategies of a
player at once. Notice that b1 and a3 are weakly dominating strategies for player
1 and player 2, respectively. Therefore, the remaining strategies would be a3
and b1. Another path of elimination might be (b2, a1, a2, a4) with the remaining
strategies {a3, a5, b1} . The latter path retains the NE (a3, b1) but also (a5, b1).
On the other hand, all paths of EWR eliminate (a1, a2, a4, a5) and the strategies
{a3, b1, b2} survive. For instance, we have
Ψ0 = {{b1, b2} ∪ {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5}}
Ψ1 = {{b1} ∪ {a3}}
Ψ2 = {{b1} ∪ {a3, a5}}
Ψ3 = {{b1, b2} ∪ {a3, a5}}
Ψ4 = {{b1, b2} ∪ {a3}}
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or
Ψ0 = {{b1, b2} ∪ {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5}}
Ψ1 = {{b1, b2} ∪ {a3}}
which is more straightforward.
The intuition is that each player has a weakly dominating strategy and against
player 1’s weakly dominating b1, player 2 wishes to play either a3 or a5 against
player 2’s weakly dominating a3, player 1 is indifferent between playing b1 or b2.
However, player 1 is still as well-off by playing either of the 2 strategies given that
player 2 chooses a5(She can play a5 if she anticipates that player 1 will play b1).
Yet, recalling b2 will make a5 weakly dominated again and player 2 will adhere
to a3.
1.2.1 The Undercutting Problem
EWR gets stuck in an infinite cycle when applied to some games. i.e. players
cannot certainly predict which strategies are admissible, which strategies their op-
ponents think are admissible, which strategies their opponents think they think
are admissible and so on ad infinitum. In such games, no matter which succes-
sive stages of reasoning are iterated by the players, it is impossible to reach a
conclusion about which strategies are permitted as a result of perfectly rational
calculation and common knowledge of perfectly rational calculation. Unfortu-
nately, this argument would still be valid even if the players could correlate their
reasonings or commit to the same steps of iterated elimination and recall. The
epistemic foundations of problems which may arise due to a tension between
”common knowledge that the players don’t play weakly dominated strategies”
and admissibility were laid by Samuelson (1992) without asserting a new proce-
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dure of elimination. Cubitt and Sugden (2011) also addresses the same problem
and suggests RBEU. Asheim and Dufwenberg (2003) resolves this issue by im-
posing that no strategy which is weakly dominated in the entire set of strategies
can be permitted in the choice sets that survive iterated steps of elimination. Our
paper shows that without such an additional requirement, EWR is sufficient to
yield the desired result. More formally, we say that an EWR process Ψ ends up in
an infinite cycle if there does not exist a sequence of restrictions (Ψ0,Ψ1, ...,Ψn)
where a strategy is weakly dominated if and only if it does not belong to Ψn.
Consider the example below:
Example 3.
a1 a2
b1 1, 1 1, 0
b2 1,−1 −1, 1
There is a unique IEWDS path which is ;
∆0 = {{b1, b2} ∪ {a1, a2}}
∆1 = {{b1} ∪ {a1, a2}}
∆2 = {{b1} ∪ {a1}}
There is also a unique EWR path which is an infinite sequence of restrictions;
For k = 0, 1, 2, ...

Ψ4k = {{b1, b2} ∪ {a1, a2}}
Ψ4k+1 = {{b1} ∪ {a1, a2}}
Ψ4k+2 = {{b1} ∪ {a1}}
Ψ4k+3 = {{b1, b2} ∪ {a1}}

A presumably fruitful way of attempting to characterize the existence of EWR
and its uniqueness is to tackle these two problems by considering sets of strate-
gies and relations among those sets rather than dealing with the elimination and
recall processes themselves. This is the same approach utilised in Asheim and
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Dufwenberg (2003) with some minor changes. It is also along the lines of ad-
missible sets approach and related common knowledge of rationality assumptions
which are widely discussed in Samuelson (1992), Brandenburger and Friedenberg
(2010), Brandenburger et al. (2008) and Börgers (1994). On that account, the fol-
lowing discussion of ”fixed restrictions’ and some conjectures we formulise might
be helpful and provide some insight on what actually changes in the structure of
surviving strategies and the deleted ones when we switch from IEWDS to EWR.
We will postulate the following conjecture:
Claim 1. Let Θ =
⋃
W⊆Φ and ∀i∈I W∩Si 6=∅
W i.e. Θ is the set of all restrictions.
Let F = Θ  2Θ be a mapping such that F (W ) =
⋃
1≤j≤n
Fj(W ) where Fi(W ) =
{si ∈ Si : si is not weakly dominated by some ti ∈ Si on W−i}. Then, EWR is
order-independent if and only if for any W , W ‘ ∈ Θ such that F (W ) = W and
F (W ‘) = W ‘, we have either W ⊆ W ‘ or W ‘ ⊆ W.
If F (W ) = W , then we call W a fixed restriction of Φ. Notice that F maps
each restriction W of Φ to a restriction of Φ. The condition required by the claim
above is ruling out cases where we have a fixed restriction which contains all other
fixed restrictions but also there exists two fixed restrictions each of which contains
at least one strategy that is not included in the other. i.e. whenever we have
W,W ‘ ⊆ W“ and W/W ‘ 6= ∅ ∧ W ‘/W 6= ∅ where F (W ) = W, F (W ‘) = W ‘and
F (W“) = W“, EWR is order-dependent. In other words, it requires a sequence
of restrictions (W 1,W 2, ...,W k) where W 1 ⊆ W 2 ⊆ ... ⊆ W k. In a 2-person
game, however, there might be two strategies constituting a Nash-Equilibrium
by yielding extremely large payoffs against each other. Say s1 ≡ max
s∈S1
π1(s, s2)
and s2 ≡ max
s∈s2
π2(s1, s) where s1 and s2 are player 1’s and player 2’s strategies,
respectively. i.e. there is no other strategy of player 1 which gives a payoff higher
than or equal to what s1 gives against s2, and vice versa. In this case, there is no
EWR stage where one of these two strategies can be eliminated. Also, we have
F ({s1, s2}) = {s1, s2}. Still, these two strategies might generate lower payoffs
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than other strategies that are available. Assume we have F (W ) = W where
W = S/ {s1, s2} . Then, no strategy is eliminated and the only EWR reduction
is the set of all strategies.
Instead, we can possibly revise the condition in four ways: First, we can allow
for fixed restrictions whose intersection is empty, yet with an exception of a fixed
restriction which is superset of other fixed restrictions. Second, we can allow for
the first revision above but without such a superset. Third, we can allow for fixed
restrictions W and W ‘ where W/W ‘ 6= ∅ ∧ W ‘/W 6= ∅ and W ∩W ‘ 6= ∅. Fourth,
we can also require a superset as in the first revision and use the third revision
along with this requirement. As we also want to account for redundant strategies,
arguably the best way to construct the conjecture is the fourth. Hence, we will
incorporate the following condition, instead:
”For a given set of fixed restrictions W =
{
W 1,W 2, ...,W k
}




W j if and only if EWR is order-independent”.
In addition, an alternative and convenient approach may be taken into con-
sideration by defining a fixed restriction in a different way:
Fixed Restriction. For each i ∈ I,let
Fi(W ) =

sj ∈ Sj : j 6= i and sj is a component of some profile s−i in a
restriction on which the set of weakly undominated strategies
that belong to player i is Wi

Then, W is a fixed restriction of F if for each i ∈ I we have W−i ∈ Fi(W ).
Note that with this definition of a fixed restriction, we are actually considering
fixed points of n different correspondences.
One might easily recognise that according to the former definition of a fixed
restriction, any strategy of player i which is not weakly dominated on W−i is
included in Fi(W ) whereas we have only opponents’ strategies in the set Fi(W )
with respect to the latter definition. In fact, there might exist more than one set
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of opponents’ profiles on which the set of weakly undominated strategies that
belong to player i is the same. Therefore, each Fi(W ) involves a correspondence
which links player i’s strategy subsets to subsets of opponents’ strategies. Notice
that although the two definitions are equivalent, they may require different tech-
nicalities. With the first sort of fixed restriction used in such assertions as ours,
we are more likely to encounter fixed point theorems in the conventional sense.
On the other hand, the second definition promises a rather intricate but possibly
dynamic and cyclical structure which requires different tools to describe and to
deal with.
Conjecture 1. Undercutting problem occurs if and only if @ a restriction W of
Φ such that Fi(W−i) = Wi for all i ∈ I.
Conjecture 2. For any Γ, ∃ a path of IEWDS which gives EWR(Γ) if ∃ a
non-empty restriction W of Φ such that Fi(W−i) = Wi for all i ∈ I.
Theorem 1. Let Γ be a finite normal form game which satisfies TDI. Then,
EWR(Γ) is well-defined. Furthermore, there exists an EWR path that gives the
same reduction as IEWDS.
Proof. Let ∆ = (∆0,∆1, ...,∆m) be a process of IEWDS with maximal elimina-
tion. i.e. Each player removes all weakly dominated strategies at once at a given
stage. The EWR path Ψ we are going to define involves no recall for the first
m stages. i.e. Ψh = ∆h for 0 ≤ h ≤ m. Consider the strategies in ∆m−1/∆m.
Let sj ∈ ∆m−1/∆m be such that it can be recalled at stage (m + 1). As sj is
weakly dominated by some other strategy on ∆m−1 and ∆m ⊂ ∆m−1, ∃tj ∈ ∆m
such that @s−j ∈ ∆m−j with πj(sj, s−j) > πj(tj, s−j). Then, ∀s−j ∈ ∆m−j, we have
πj(sj, s−j) = πj(tj, s−j). Define Ψ
m+1 = ∆m ∪ {sj} . Namely, we recall only a
single strategy, if there is any, and it belongs to the set of strategies eliminated
at the final stage of IEWDS. There is no weakly dominated strategy in Ψm+1 and
we recall another strategy si ∈ ∆m−1/∆m, if there is any where i ∈ I. i.e. i is
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not necessarily a different player, we can have i = j. Since si is also eliminated
at stage m, the argument we used for sj applies to si as well. i.e. ∃ti ∈ ∆m such
that either ∀s−i ∈ ∆m−i ∪ {sj} , we have πi(si, s−i) = πi(ti, s−i) or ∀s−i ∈ ∆m−i,
πi(ti, s−i) ≥ πi(si, s−i) and for some s−i ∈ ∆m−i, πi(ti, s−i) > πi(si, s−i) and for
some s−ij ∈ ∆m−ij we have πi(si, sj, s−ij) > πi(ti, sj, s−ij)(One of these two condi-
tions should apply to any strategy tj ∈ ∆m with which sj generates equal payoffs
on ∆m−j. Hence, it should apply to the strategy which eliminated sj at stagem as sj
is recalled back to a restriction with same payoff structure as the IEWDS reduc-
tion) Suppose the latter holds. Then, since s−j, s−ij ∈ ∆m =⇒ s−j, s−ij ∈ ∆m−1,
si wouldn‘t be weakly dominated by ti on ∆
m−1
−i . Thus, ∀s−i ∈ ∆m−i ∪ {sj} ,
πi(si, s−i) = πi(ti, s−i). As a consequence, ∀ s−ij ∈ ∆m−ij, by TDI we have
πj(tj, ti, s−ij) = πj(sj, ti, s−ij) =⇒ πI(tj, ti, s−ij) = πI(sj, ti, s−ij) (1.1)
πi(sj, ti, s−ij) = πi(sj, si, s−ij) =⇒ πI(sj, ti, s−ij) = πI(sj, si, s−ij) (1.2)
πi(tj, ti, s−ij) = πi(tj, si, s−ij) =⇒ πI(tj, ti, s−ij) = πI(tj, si, s−ij) (1.3)
Hence, by ( 1.1), (2) and (3),
πI(tj, ti, s−ij) = πI(sj, ti, s−ij) = πI(tj, si, s−ij) = πI(sj, si, s−ij).
i.e. the payoff structure of ∆m is preserved by ∆m ∪ {si, sj} as any payoff profile
that can be constructed by the latter set can also be constructed by the for-
mer. In other words, si and sj are redundant to ∆
m. Furthermore, there is no
weakly dominated strategy in the set ∆m ∪ {si, sj} . One can easily show that
the same argument applies if we continue to recall strategies one by one from the
set ∆m−1/∆m. If there isn’t any strategy to recall in the set ∆m−1/∆m to begin
with, then we apply the same procedure to ∆m−2/∆m−1. If there is no strategy
to recall in ∆m−2/∆m−1, then we recall a single strategy from ∆m−3/∆m−2 and
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so on.
For 1 < k < m, assume there exists a strategy sj ∈ ∆m−p/∆m−p+1 for some
p > k which is not weakly dominated on Ψk. If for each tj ∈ Ψk, ∃s−j ∈ Ψk−j
such that πj(sj, s−j) > πj(tj, s−j), then since Ψ
k ⊂ ∆m−p, @tj ∈ ∆m−p such
that tj weakly dominates sj on ∆
m−p and sj ∈ ∆m−p+1. Contradiction. Thus,
∃tj ∈ Ψk such that ∀s−j ∈ Ψk−j we have πj(tj, s−j) ≥ πj(sj, s−j) and as sj is
not weakly dominated on Ψk, ∀s−j ∈ Ψk−j, πj(tj, s−j) = πj(sj, s−j). For each
step k of Ψ with k > 1 and after each strategy sj we recall at that stage, we
are going to recall all strategies that are eliminated after sj in ∆ process and
became weakly undominated once sj is recalled. Let si ∈ Si be a such strategy.
Then, ∃ti ∈ Ψk such that ti weakly dominates si on Ψk−i but ∃s−i ∈ Ψk+1−i such
that πi(si, s−i) > πi(ti, s−i). Then, sj is a component of s−i as Ψ
k+1/Ψk = {sj}.
i.e. πi(si, sj, s−ij) > πi(ti, sj, s−ij) for some s−ij ∈ Ψk−ij. Since πj(ti, sj, s−ij) =
πj(ti, tj, s−ij), by TDI we have πi(ti, sj, s−ij) = πi(ti, tj, s−ij). Again by TDI,
if πj(si, sj, s−ij) = πj(si, tj, s−ij), then πi(si, sj, s−ij) = πi(si, tj, s−ij) Thus,
πi(si, sj, s−ij) > πi(ti, sj, s−ij) =⇒ πi(si, tj, s−ij) > πi(ti, tj, s−ij). As tj and
s−ij are not weakly dominated at the stage where si is weakly dominated by ti,
we have a contradiction. Since si is an arbitrarily chosen among the strategies
eliminated after sj, no strategy eliminated after sj will be recalled after sj. Finally
we run induction on strategies which are eliminated at a given stage and then,
on stages until we get to the first stage of Ψ. Hence, proof is complete.
Next, we evoke the issue of order-independence and show that a result similar
to the one which holds for IEWDS is also true for EWR. In the following theorem,
we abuse the notation for convenience and write that a profile is an element of a
set of strategies whenever it is constructed solely by strategies from that set. A
similar notation is used for opponent strategies etc. All the superscripts are for
stages and all the subscripts are for players.
For the first two parts of the following theorem, we employ the same approach.
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We take two sets one of which is a subset of the other, A ⊂ B where A is
the set obtained by IEWDS(EWR) and B is the set obtained by applying a
correspondence (that will be defined in the proof) on the reduction set obtained
by IEWDS and on the reduction set obtained by EWR for the first and the
second parts’ respectively. We consider an arbitrarily chosen si ∈ B/A and show
that si cannot be eliminated by a strategy from A, B/A or S/B when IEWDS is
applied for the first case and EWR for the second.
Theorem 2. For a finite normal form game Γ that satisfies TDI, we have
EWR(Γ) = IEWDS(Γ) where IEWDS(Γ) is the unique reduction obtained
by applying TDI. i.e. the reduction obtained by EWR and the reduction obtained
by IEWDS are equivalent up to redundant strategies. Therefore, for such games
EWR is also order-independent.
Proof. Let ∆ = (∆0,∆1, ...,∆m) be a sequence of IEWDS restrictions where
∆0 = Φ and ∆m is the IEWDS reduction of Φ. Let Ψ = (Ψ0,Ψ1, ...,Ψn) be a
sequence of EWR restrictions with Ψ0 = Φ and Ψn being an EWR reduction
of Φ. We want to show that for any i ∈ I and si ∈ Si, si ∈ EWR(Γ) ⇐⇒
si ∈ IEWDS(Γ). In order to do so, we are going to show that neither Ψn nor
∆m is a proper subset of the other and it is not the case that both of them
include a strategy which is not an element of the other. i.e. ¬ [Ψn ⊂ ∆m] and
¬ [∆m ⊂ Ψn] and ¬ [Ψn/∆m 6= ∅ and ∆m/Ψn 6= ∅] .Assume ∆m ⊂ Ψn with si ∈
Ψn/∆m. Then, there exists ∆k and ∆k−1 such that si ∈ ∆k−1/∆k and ti ∈ Si
such that ti weakly dominates si on ∆
k−1. We also know that if a strategy xi
weakly dominates yi on a superset of ∆
m, then @ any opponent profile s−i ∈ ∆m−i
such that πi(yi, s−i) > πi(xi, s−i) (otherwise, since strategies that construct s−i
are also elements of the superset of ∆m, xi wouldn’t weakly dominate yi). Since
∆m ⊂ ∆k−1 and ti weakly dominates si on ∆k−1, @ any opponent profile s−i ∈ ∆m−i
such that πi(si, s−i) > πi(ti, s−i) . If ti is eliminated in some interim stage r such




−i and @ any s−i ∈ ∆m−i such that πi(ti, s−i) > πi(pi, s−i). Hence, @
s−i ∈ ∆m−i such that πi(si, s−i) > πi(pi, s−i). If pi is also eliminated at stage
s with r < s < m, then there exists vi such that vi weakly dominates pi on
∆s−i and for all s−i ∈ ∆m−i we have πi(vi, s−i) ≥ πi(pi, s−i) and so on. Since we
have a finite number of stages and strategies, there exists zi ∈ ∆m for which @
s−i ∈ ∆m−i such that πi(si, s−i) > πi(zi, s−i). On the other hand, zi, si ∈ Ψn.i.e.
zi does not weakly dominate si on Ψ
n
−i. If ∀si ∈ Ψn/∆m and such zi ∈ ∆m, then
∀s−i ∈ Ψn−i we have πi(si, s−i) = πi(zi, s−i) and the claim is true. Assume not.
Then, there exists s−i ∈ Ψn−i with at least one strategy sj ∈ Ψn/∆m such that
πi(si, s−i) > πi(zi, s−i). By the same token, sj ∈ Ψn/∆m =⇒ ∃tj ∈ ∆m such
that ∀s−j ∈ ∆m−j , we have πj(tj, s−j) ≥ πj(sj, s−j). Then, either
@s−j ∈ Ψn \∆m s.t. πj(sj, s−j) > πj(tj, s−j) and
∃s−j ∈ ∆m−j s.t. π(tj, s−j) > π(sj, s−j) (1.4)
or
∀s−j ∈ Ψn, πj(sj, s−j) = πj(tj, s−j). (1.5)
If (1.4) holds, then sj /∈ Ψn as it would be weakly dominated by tj on Ψn−j.
A contradiction. If (1.5) holds, by TDI πi(sj, s−j) > πi(tj, s−j), i.e., for all
s−ij ∈ Ψn−ij,
πj(si, sj, s−ij) = πj(si, tj, s−ij) =⇒ πi(si, sj, s−ij) = πi(si, tj, s−ij) (1.6)
and
πj(ti, sj, s−ij) = πj(ti, tj, s−ij) =⇒ πi(ti, sj, s−ij) = πi(ti, tj, s−ij). (1.7)
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Since πi(si, sj, s−ij) > πi(ti, sj, s−ij) for some s−ij ∈ Ψn−ij, by (1.6) and (1.7) we
have
πi(si, tj, s−ij) > πi(ti, tj, s−ij) (1.8)
for such s−ij ∈ Ψn−ij.
Therefore, if for each component sk ∈ Ψn/∆m of s−j (2) holds, then follow-
ing from (1.8), we have πi(si, t−i) > πi(ti, t−i) where t−i ∈ ∆m−i. A contradic-
tion. Hence, there exists an sj ∈ Ψn/∆m, an s−j with at least one component
from Ψn/∆m and a tj ∈ ∆m such that tj weakly dominates sj on ∆m−j and
πj(sj, s−j) > πj(tj, s−j) with sj being a component of s−i where πi(si, s−i) >
πi(ti, s−i). Therefore, for each si ∈ Ψn/∆m for which @ti ∈ ∆m such that for
all s−i ∈ Ψn−i πi(si, s−i) = πi(ti, s−i) there exists a such sj. Denote the set of
such sj by α(si, ti). Let α(si) =
⋃
ti∈∆mi
α(si, ti). Let α(α(si)) = α
2 be the union
of set of strategies obtained by applying α to each strategy in α(si). Consider
the sequence (α(si), α




αj(si) for some finite k. Set α
k(si) = α. Consider the first
strategy eliminated from α by IEWDS. For each ti ∈ ∆m and si ∈ α, there exists
either
(a) t−i ∈ ∆m−i such that πi(si, t−i) > πi(ti, t−i) or
(b) s−i ∈ ∆m−i
⋃
α such that πi(si, s−i) > πi(ti, s−i)
p
Therefore, the first strategy cannot be eliminated by a strategy from ∆m. If
the first strategy is eliminated by a strategy gi ∈ Si/Ψni , then πi(gi, s−i) ≥
πi(si, s−i) ∀s−i ∈ ∆m
⋃
α. Note that we can construct an opponent profile s−i ∈
∆m
⋃
α since each player has at least one strategy in ∆m(because it is the reduc-
tion obtained by IEWDS). We also know that here exists a strategy ei ∈ Ψni
such that ei weakly dominates gi on Ψ−i and for each si ∈ Ψni there exists a profile
s−i ∈ Ψn−i such that πi(si, s−i) > πi(gi, s−i) since otherwise gi would be recalled
back to Ψn. By (a) and (b), there exists s−i ∈ ∆m
⋃
α for each si ∈ α and each
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ti ∈ ∆m such that πi(si, s−i) > πi(ti, s−i). Therefore, for each ti ∈ ∆m there exists
s−i ∈ ∆m
⋃
α such that πi(gi, s−i) > πi(ti, s−i). Moreover, for each yi ∈ Ψn such
that πi(yi, s−i) = πi(ti, s−i) where ti ∈ ∆m and s−i ∈ Ψn−i (i.e. yi ∈ Ψn/ [∆m
⋃
α]),
we have πi(gi, s−i) > πi(yi, s−i) for some s−i ∈ ∆m
⋃
α. Hence, a strategy which
weakly dominates gi on Ψ
n
−i cannot be an element of Ψ
n/ [∆m
⋃
α] or ∆m and
has to be an element of α. Since πi(gi, s−i) ≥ πi(si, s−i) ∀s−i ∈ ∆m
⋃
α and
πi(si, s−i) ≥ πi(gi, s−i) ∀s−i ∈ Ψn−i, we have πi(gi, s−i) = πi(si, s−i) ∀s−i ∈
∆m
⋃
α. By TDI, πi(gi, s−i) = πi(si, s−i) =⇒ πI(gi, s−i) = πI(si, s−i). i.e.
For each sj ∈ α and ti ∈ ∆m and s−ij ∈ ∆m
⋃
α, we have πj(si, sj, s−ij) >

















α(sI) where I also




payoff structures are preserved, so are the weak dominance relations).
Then we consider the first strategy eliminated from ∆m
⋃
α′ by IEWDS. By
the same arguments we used for the first strategy eliminated from ∆m
⋃
α, it
cannot be eliminated by a strategy from ∆m. If it’s eliminated by a strategy from
S/Ψn, then we have a new collection α′′ of sets of strategies such that the first
strategy eliminated from ∆m
⋃
α′′ by IEWDS cannot be eliminated by a strategy
from ∆m and so on. Since we have a finite number of strategies, the first strategy
eliminated from one of those collections must be eliminated by a strategy which
is also an element of the same collection. Without loss of generality, say si ∈ α
is eliminated by hi ∈ α. Then, for each s−i ∈ ∆m
⋃
α, πi(hi, s−i) ≥ πi(si, s−i).
If there exists s−i ∈ ∆m
⋃
α such that πi(hi, s−i) > πi(si, s−i), then there exists
s−i ∈ Ψn with at least one component from Ψn/ [∆m
⋃
α] such that πi(si, s−i) >
πi(hi, s−i). For each such component sj ∈ Ψn/ [∆m
⋃
α] , since πj(si, sj, s−ij) =
πj(si, tj, s−ij) for some tj ∈ ∆m, by TDI we have πi(si, sj, s−ij) = πi(si, tj, s−ij)
and πi(hi, sj, s−ij) = πi(hi, tj, s−ij) for all s−ij ∈ Ψn−ij. Therefore, πi(hi, sj, s−ij) >
πi(si, sj, s−ij) =⇒ πi(hi, tj, s−ij) = πi(si, tj, s−ij). By replacing each such com-
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ponent sj ∈ Ψn/ [∆m
⋃
α] of s−i where πi(si, s−i) > πi(hi, s−i) with tj ∈ ∆m such
that πj(tj, s−j) = πj(sj, s−j) ∀s−j ∈ Ψn−j, we construct s−i ∈ ∆m
⋃
α such that
πi(si, s−i) > πi(hi, s−i). A contradiction. Hence, πi(si, s−i) = πi(hi, s−i) for all
s−i ∈ ∆m
⋃
α.By TDI, πi(hi, s−i) = πi(si, s−i) =⇒ πI(hi, s−i) = πI(si, s−i).
i.e. For each sj ∈ α and ti ∈ ∆m and s−ij ∈ ∆m
⋃
α, we have πj(si, sj, s−ij) >
πj(si, tj, s−ij) =⇒ πj(hi, sj, s−ij) > πj(hi, tj, s−ij). Therefore, α(si) = α(hi) and





















the payoff structures are preserved, so are the weak dominance relations).
Then, we consider the first strategy eliminated from ∆m
⋃
α′ by IEWDS.
By the same arguments we used for the first strategy eliminated from ∆m
⋃
α,
it cannot be eliminated by a strategy from ∆m. If it’s eliminated by a strategy
from S/Ψn, then we have a new collection α′′ of sets of strategies such that the
first strategy eliminated from ∆m
⋃
α′′ by IEWDS cannot be eliminated by a
strategy from ∆m and so on. Since we have a finite number of strategies, the
first strategy eliminated from one of those collections must be eliminated by a
strategy which is also an element of the same collection and so on.
On the contrary, assume Ψn ⊂ ∆m. For some k ∈ N, we have sj ∈ Ψh−1/Ψh =⇒
sj /∈ ∆m/Ψn where 1 ≤ h ≤ k. Let si ∈ ∆m/Ψnwith si ∈ Ψk/Ψk+1 such that
for 1 ≤ h ≤ k we have sj ∈ ∆m/Ψn =⇒ sj /∈ Ψh−1/Ψh. Namely, si is the
first strategy eliminated from ∆m/Ψn by EWR. Assume that for k such that
sj ∈ Ψk =⇒ sj ∈ Ψk+1 where sj ∈ ∆m/Ψn, we have st ∈ Ψk =⇒ st ∈ Ψk+1
for all t ∈ I. That is, prior to the elimination of the first strategy from ∆m/Ψn,
no strategy is eliminated from Ψn, either. Consequently, before the stage where
si is weakly dominated, all the other strategies in ∆
m have survived the pre-
vious stages, too. si is weakly dominated for the first time at some stage by
ti ∈ ∆m =⇒
[
sj ∈ ∆m =⇒ sj ∈ Ψk
]
. Since si ∈ ∆m/Ψn, for each ti ∈ Ψni
such that ti weakly dominates si on Ψ
n, ∃s−i ∈ ∆m−i with at least one strategy
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from ∆m/Ψn such that πi(si, s−i) > πi(ti, s−i). As the components of s−i are also
elements of Ψk, si cannot be eliminated by ti ∈ Ψni
Conversely, assume that ∃tj ∈ Ψn and k ∈ N such that tj /∈ Ψk and si ∈
Ψk. Indeed, let tj be the first strategy eliminated from Ψ
n (hence recalled at a
later stage) before any strategy is eliminated from ∆m/Ψn. (Here, j and i aren’t
necessarily distinct players as they are throughout the rest of the proof). Since
tj ∈ Ψn, we have either
For each tj ∈ Ψnj and sj ∈ S,∃t−j ∈ Ψn−j s.t. πj(tj, t−j) > πj(sj, t−j) (1.9)
or
∃ej ∈ Ψnj such that πj(tj, t−j) = πj(ej, t−j)∀t−j ∈ Ψn−j and ∃s−j with
at least one component from S/Ψn such that πj(ej, s−j) > πj(tj, s−j)
and there does not exist any s−j ∈ Ψn−j such that πj(tj, s−j) > πj(ej, s−j)
where tj is weakly dominated by ej at stage k. (1.10)
.a.
If (1.9) holds, then tj cannot be the first strategy eliminated from Ψ
n. Assume
(1.10) holds. Then, since ej, kj ∈ Ψn ⊂ ∆m, for all s−j ∈ ∆m−j, we have
πj(tj, s−j) = πj(ej, s−j). By TDI, πI(tj, s−j) = πI(ej, s−j) for all s−j ∈ ∆m−j.
In particular, πi(si, tj, s−ij) = πi(si, ej, s−ij) and πi(ti, tj, s−ij) = πi(ti, ej, s−ij)
where s−ij ∈ ∆m−ij and si is the first strategy eliminated from ∆m/Ψn with ti being
the strategy that weakly dominates it. Since πi(si, tj, s−ij) > πi(ti, tj, s−ij) =⇒
πi(si, ej, s−ij) > πi(ti, ej, s−ij), the elimination of tj does not make si weakly domi-
nated by ti.
Assume that before the first strategy from ∆m/Ψn is eliminated and after the
first strategy from Ψn is eliminated, some strategy gk ∈ Ψnk is also eliminated.
30
(Notice that all the statements are true regardless of whether only one strategy
is eliminated from Ψn at stage k where 1 ≤ h ≤ k − 1, sj ∈ Ψnj =⇒ sj ∈ Ψhj or
many.) Since for each s−j ∈ ∆m−j ∃ej such that πj(tj, s−j) = πj(ej, s−j), for each
sk ∈ ∆mk , and each s−kj ∈ ∆m−kj by TDI we have:
πj(gk, tj, s−kj) = πj(gk, ej, s−kj) =⇒ πk(gk, tj, s−kj) = πk(gk, ej, s−kj) (1.11)
πj(sk, tj, s−kj) = πj(sk, ej, s−kj) =⇒ πk(sk, tj, s−kj) = πk(sk, ej, s−kj) (1.12)
From (1.11) and (1.12) we have
πk(gk, tj, s−kj) > πk(sk, tj, s−kj) =⇒ πk(gk, ej, s−kj) > πk(sk, ej, s−kj).
Hence, gk ∈ Ψnkcannot be weakly dominated by some strategy sk ∈ ∆mk . For each
sk ∈ ∆m/Ψn, ∃s−k ∈ Ψn−k such that πk(gk, s−k) > πk(sk, s−k)(Otherwise sk would
be recalled). One component of s−k ∈ Ψn−k may be eliminated in one of the earlier
stages but (8) and (9) apply again. Therefore, gk can be eliminated only by a
strategy also from Ψnk . Thus, the first strategy eliminated from ∆
m/Ψn cannot
be eliminated by a strategy from Ψn.
Assume that the first strategy si eliminated from ∆
m/Ψn is eliminated by a
strategy ti which is also from ∆
m/Ψn. Since si, ti ∈ ∆m, we have either
(c)∀s−i ∈ ∆m−i, πi(si, s−i) = πi(ti, s−i) or
(d) ∃s−i, t−i ∈ ∆m−i such that πi(si, s−i) = πi(ti, s−i) and
πi(ti, t−i) > πi(si, t−i)
If (d) holds, since si is the first strategy to be eliminated from ∆
m/Ψn
and all such s−i, t−i ∈ ∆m−i profiles have survived, then si is not weakly dom-
inated at this stage. Assume (c) holds. Since si ∈ ∆m/Ψn, ∃ki such that
ki weakly dominates si on Ψ
n and ∃s−i ∈ ∆m−i with at least one component
from ∆m/Ψn such that πi(si, s−i) > πi(ki, s−i) for such si and ki. Then, we de-
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fine correspondence β which is similar to α we had defined earlier: β(si, ki) =
{sj : j 6= i and sj is a component of some s−i such that πi(si, s−i) > πi(ki, s−i)} Since
πi(si, s−i) > πi(ki, s−i) =⇒ πi(ti, s−i) > πi(ki, s−i) for all s−i ∈ ∆m−i, β(si, ki) =
β(ti, ki) By the same reasoning we employed for the case with α, we conclude
that the first strategy eliminated from ∆m/Ψn is not eliminated by a strategy
from ∆m/Ψn. Therefore, we have ¬ [Ψn ⊂ ∆m] .
(Notice that the first strategy eliminated from ∆m/Ψn may be recalled at a
later stage. Our result still holds, though)
Finally, assume we have both ∆m/Ψn 6= ∅ and Ψn/∆m 6= ∅. Then, there are
two possible cases, either ∆m ∩ Ψn 6= ∅ or ∆m ∩ Ψn = ∅. Assume ∆m ∩ Ψn 6= ∅.
∃ a k ∈ N and a restriction ∆k from the sequence (∆0,∆1, ...,∆m) such that si ∈
Ψn/∆m =⇒ si ∈ ∆h for 1 ≤ h ≤ k and ∃ si ∈ Ψn/∆m such that si ∈ ∆k−1/∆k.
i.e. si is the first strategy eliminated from Ψ
n/∆m in a given IEWDS process.
Therefore, ∃ ti ∈ ∆k such that for all s−i ∈ ∆k−1, πi(ti, s−i) ≥ πi(si, s−i). Since
no strategy is yet eliminated from Ψn/∆m in stage (k − 1) and all the strategies
in ∆m(and hence ∆m ∩ Ψn) survive IEWDS, we have Ψn ⊂ ∆k−1. Then, for
each s−i ∈ Ψn−i, πi(ti, s−i) ≥ πi(si, s−i) and ti ∈ Ψn. Since si is also an element
of Ψn, we have πi(ti, s−i) = πi(si, s−i) for all s−i ∈ Ψn−i. Let Gk be the set of
strategies which are elements of Ψn/∆m and which are eliminated at stage k. Let
the strategies Gk = {si, gj, ..., xp} be eliminated by {ti, hj, ..., yp} , respectively.
Then, {ti, hj, ..., yp} ⊂ Ψn. By TDI, ∀s−ijkp ∈ Ψn−ijkp, ∀ck, dk ∈ Ψnk ,
πi(si, gj, xp, ck, s−ijkp) = πi(ti, gj, xp, ck, s−ijkp) =⇒ (1.13)
πk(si, gj, xp, ck, s−ijkp) = πk(ti, gj, xp, ck, s−ijkp)
and
πi(si, gj, xp, dk, s−ijkp) = πi(ti, gj, xp, dk, s−ijkp) =⇒ (1.14)
πk(si, gj, xp, dk, s−ijkp) = πk(ti, gj, xp, dk, s−ijkp).
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By (1.13) and (1.14),
πk(si, gj, xp, ck, s−ijkp) ≥ πk(si, gj, xp, dk, s−ijkp) =⇒ (1.15)
πk(ti, gj, xp, ck, s−ijkp) ≥ πk(ti, gj, xp, dk, s−ijkp),
without loss of generality. By the same token,
πj(ti, gj, xp, ck, s−ijkp) = πj(ti, hj, xp, ck, s−ijkp) =⇒ (1.16)
πi(ti, gj, xp, ck, s−ijkp) = πi(ti, hj, xp, ck, s−ijkp) =⇒
πk(ti, gj, xp, ck, s−ijkp) = πk(ti, hj, xp, ck, s−ijkp),
and
πj(ti, gj, xp, dk, s−ijkp) = πj(ti, hj, xp, dk, s−ijkp) =⇒ (1.17)
πi(ti, gj, xp, dk, s−ijkp) = πi(ti, hj, xp, dk, s−ijkp) =⇒
πk(ti, gj, xp, dk, s−ijkp) = πk(ti, hj, xp, dk, s−ijkp).
By (1.15), (1.16), (1.17), we have
πk(ti, hj, xp, ck, s−ijkp) ≥ πk(ti, hj, xp, dk, s−ijkp),
and iterating further
πk(ti, hj, yp, ck, s−ijkp) ≥ πk(ti, hj, yp, dk, s−ijkp),
and so on. Notice that for any combination of strategies from Gk, we have a
corresponding combination of strategies from ∆m ∩Ψn which preserves the weak
dominance relation between ck and dk. Hence, for any s−k ∈ Ψn−k, ∃ t−k ∈ Ψn/Gk
such that for all ck, dk ∈ Ψn, we have πk(ck, s−k) ≥ πk(dk, s−k) =⇒ πk(ck, t−k) ≥
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πk(dk, t−k).
Consider the strategies eliminated at stage (k + 1) in Ψn/∆m, if any. For
each si ∈ Gk+1, ∃ti ∈ ∆k+1 such that ti weakly dominates si on ∆k. If ti /∈ Ψn,
then ∃hi ∈ Ψn such that hi weakly dominates ti on Ψn−i. Since s−i ∈ Ψn/Gk =⇒
s−i ∈ ∆k, we have s−i ∈ Ψn/Gk =⇒ πi(ti, s−i) ≥ πi(si, s−i). Then, as s−i ∈
Ψn/Gk, we have πi(hi, s−i) ≥ πi(ti, s−i) and therefore, πi(hi, s−i) ≥ πi(si, s−i)
Since for each s−i ∈ Ψn/Gk ∃ t−i ∈ Ψn−i such that πi(si, s−i) = πi(si, t−i) and
πi(hi, s−i) = πi(hi, t−i) as shown above, we conclude that πi(hi, t−i) ≥ πi(si, t−i)
for all t−i ∈ Ψn−i. Since both siand hi are elements of Ψni , then πi(hi, t−i) =
πi(si, t−i) ∀t−i ∈ Ψn−i. Thus, by iterating the argument in the equations above
and running induction on Gk, Gk+1, ..., Gm, for each si ∈ Gk ∪ Gk+1 ∪ ... ∪ Gm,
∃ hi ∈ ∆m ∩ Ψn such that πi(hi, s−i) = πi(si, s−i) ∀s−i ∈ Ψn−i. Hence, Ψn and
∆m ∩ Ψn are equivalent up to redundant strategies. Consequently, it is enough
to show that ∆m is also strategically equivalent to ∆m ∩ Ψn(up to redundant
strategies)
Consider the first strategy sj eliminated from ∆
m/Ψn in the EWR process
Ψ. i.e. ∃k ∈ N and a restriction Ψk from the sequence (Ψ0,Ψ1, ...,Ψn) such
that sj ∈ ∆m/Ψn =⇒ sj ∈ Ψh for 1 ≤ h < k − 1 and ∃sj ∈ ∆m/Ψn with
sj ∈ Ψk−1/Ψk. Suppose that ∃tj ∈ ∆m ∩Ψn such that tj weakly dominates sj on
Ψk−1. As tj, sj ∈ ∆m, we have either
∀s−j ∈ ∆m−j, πj(sj, s−j) = πj(tj, s−j) (e)
or
∃s−j, t−j ∈ ∆m−j s.t. πj(sj, s−j) > πj(tj, s−j) and πj(tj, t−j) > πj(sj, t−j). (f)
If (f) holds, then sj cannot be weakly dominated by tj as ∆
m ⊆ ∆k−1. Assume
(e) holds. Then, sj is redundant. Then, it follows from the same idea in (1.15),
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(1.16), (1.17) that either all strategies in ∆m/Ψn are redundant or the first
strategy which is not redundant and eliminated cannot be eliminated by some
tj ∈ ∆m ∩Ψn.
If the first strategy sj eliminated from ∆
m/Ψn is eliminated by a strategy
tj ∈ ∆m/Ψn, since ∆m ⊆ ∆k−1 and sj, tj ∈ ∆m, then πj(sj, s−j) = πj(tj, s−j) for
all s−j ∈ ∆m−j. Then, it follows from the same idea in (1.15), (1.16), (1.17) that
sj is not weakly dominated by some tj ∈ ∆m/Ψn.
Assume sj is eliminated by some tj /∈ ∆m∪Ψn, then. Since tj /∈ ∆m, ∃gj ∈ ∆m
such that πj(gj, g−j) ≥ πj(tj, g−j) for all g−j ∈ ∆m−j. If tj weakly dominates sj on
∆m, then πj(gj, g−j) ≥ πj(tj, g−j) ≥ πj(sj, g−j) for all g−j ∈ ∆m−j and πj(gj, g−j) ≥
πj(tj, g−j) > πj(sj, g−j) for some g−j ∈ ∆m−j. i.e. gj also weakly dominates sj on
∆m but as sj, gj ∈ ∆m, we have a contradiction. Thus, πj(sj, s−j) = πj(tj, s−j) for
all s−j ∈ ∆m−j. If @gj ∈ ∆m such that πj(sj, s−j) = πj(gj, s−j) for all s−j ∈ ∆m−j,
then, for each gj ∈ ∆mj ∃s−j ∈ ∆m−j such that πj(sj, s−j) > πj(gj, s−j) As
∀s−j ∈ ∆m−j we have πj(sj, s−j) = πj(tj, s−j), then for each gj ∈ ∆mj ∃s−j ∈ ∆m−j
such that πj(tj, s−j) > πj(gj, s−j). Hence, tj ∈ ∆mj . Contradiction. Thus, sj is
not eliminated by some tj /∈ ∆m ∪ Ψn and we cannot have ∆m/Ψn 6= ∅ and
Ψn/∆m 6= ∅ and ∆m ∩Ψn 6= ∅.
On the contrary, suppose ∆m ∩ Ψn = ∅. Consider the first strategy sj elimi-
nated from Ψn in a given IEWDS process. Let sj ∈ ∆k−1/∆k. Since Ψn ⊆ ∆k−1,
for each tj /∈ Ψn ∃s−j ∈ Ψn−j such that πj(sj, s−j) > πj(tj, s−j). Therefore, no
tj /∈ Ψn can weakly dominate sj on ∆k−1. Suppose sj is weakly dominated by some
tj ∈ Ψn on ∆k−1. As sj, tj ∈ Ψn and Ψn ⊆ ∆k−1, we have πj(sj, s−j) = πj(tj, s−j)
for all s−j ∈ Ψn−j. It follows from the same idea in (1.15), (1.16), (1.17) that
elimination of sj does not change the payoff structure. Thus, the proof is com-
plete.
While EWR and IEWDS suggest payoff equivalent sets of solutions in TDI
games, one may wonder if one concept prevails over the other when we turn
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attention to games that don’t satisfy TDI. We have already seen that IEWDS
has an advantage over EWR when it comes to making predictions about games
with ’undercutting problem’. In order to demonstrate that it is not always the
case, let’s compare EWR and IEWDS by using our first example in the light
of TDI. There are two different reductions one can obtain by devising IEWDS
which are {a3, b1} and {a3, a5, b1}. Notice that these reductions are not payoff
equivalent as we have π(b1, a5) = (6, 2) 6= (6, 3) = π(b1, a3). This is due to the fact
that the game does not satisfy TDI. We have π2(b1, a3) = π2(b1, a5) = 6, although
π1(b1, a3) = 3 and π1(b1, a5) = 2. i.e. When player 2 changes her strategy from
{a3} to {a5} while player 1 is playing {b1}, she does not change her own payoff but
her opponent’s. Nevertheless, we have a unique EWR reduction which includes
the strategy profile (b2, a3) and the associated payoff profile (3, 7), a payoff profile
that cannot be obtained by strategy profiles that survive at least one of the
two IEWDS paths. This counterexample proves two things: First, EWR and
IEWDS are not equivalent solution concepts if we don’t restrict attention to TDI
games but consider the entire set of finite normal-form games. Second, there are
games in which EWR is order-independent but IEWDS is not. An interesting
question which might arouse the reader’s curiosity as EWR and IEWDS predict
different Nash-Equilibria (NE) in the example mentioned above: Is there any
logical relation between Nash-Equilibria deemed possible to arise by EWR and
IEWDS? Under which conditions can one expect a NE to become more likely to
be played if the strategies involved survive both concepts of iterative elimination?
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Chapter 2
A Characterization of The
Proportional Rule
2.1 Motivation and Literature Review
A bankruptcy arises when there is a scarce resource and conflicting claims over it.
Since the available resource is in sufficient to honour all the claims, many different
suggestons on how to divide may arise. The common aspect of these suggestios
is that no claimant gets more than his claim and nobody gets a negative share.
A very common example of a bankruptcy problem is the process of liquidation of
an insolvent firm among its creditors.
The study of bankruptcy problems has a historical tradition and dates back to
the Babylonian Talmud. The Talmud involves two examples regarding bankruptcy
situations one of which is about two men conflicting over how to share of a gar-
ment. The second one involves a man who leaves mutually inconsistent bequests
to his three wifes. Nevertheless, it provides only numerical examples and no
generalization. The most popular generalization of those numbers is probably
suggested by Aumann and Maschler (1985). Although the problem is very intu-
itive and old, the formal study of it started as late as O’Neill (1982).Traditionally,
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there has been two main branches in the literature, axiomatic bankruptcy which
aims to characterize bankruptcy rules by some normative but highly regarded
properties and game theoretical approach which aims to design games solutions
of which coincide with bankruptcy rules. In the present paper, we take the first
approach and define union−consistency in order to characterize the proportional
rule. Consistency and its variations have been widely used for characterizing
rules. Young (1987) uses consistency along with equal treatment of equals and
continuity to characterize parametric rules. Kaminski (2006) generalizes Young’s
result. Thomson (2007) develops a technique which determines whether a rule
which is defined for 2-agents can be generalized to an arbitrary number of agents
Dagan et al. (1997) shows that there may be particular solutions without a con-
sistent extension. Moulin (2000) uses consistency in order to obtain a joint char-
acterization of the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule and the
constrained equal losses rule. Chun (1999) proves that a consistent rule also
satisfies converse consistency Herrero and Villar (2001) considers the same class
of rules as in Moulin (2000) and obtain separate characterization results for the
constrained equal awards rule, the constrained equal losses rule and the Talmud
rule. Since our union−Consistency is a group property, it is noexaggeration to
say that it is loosely related to Chambers and Thomson (2002) which study group
order preservation. They also use a similar approach to ours in their proof.That
is why they require claims continuity as well. They characterise PROP. as our
paper do but they use group order preservation, claims continuity and consis-
tency. Since claims continuity and consistency are satisfied by a large class of
rules, the key assumption in their result is group order preservation which is de-
fined as ”given two groups of claimants, suppose that the sum of the claims of
the members of the first group is greater than or equal to the sum of the claims
of the members of the second group. Then, similar inequalities should hold for
the sums of the awards to the members of the two groups, and for the sums of
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the losses incurred by the members of two groups”, as it appears in their paper.
However, the assertion of union consistency does not stick to the original claims
problem, as the union of groups chosen for comparison does not have to be equal
to that of the original problem‘s, but rather decides what each group should get
by evaluating the conflicting claims of the groups in a new problem created by
considering the sum of the claims of the members of each group as an individual
claim. In addition, union consistency requires an equality between the awards
received by the groups whereas group order preservation requires a ”greater than
or equal to”. Dagan and Volij (1997) also prove results on extensions of bilateral
rules using consistency and average consistency. They analyze how to extend a
given bilateral principle to a unique consistent rule and relate it to a family of
binary relations.
It is worth mentioning that Thomson (2003) provides a detailed survey on
bankruptcy rules.
2.1.1 union−Consistency
Definition 6. (Claims Problem) A claims problem is an ordered pair (E; d) ∈
R+ × Rn++ where d = (d1, ..., dn) and
∑n
i=1 di > E.
We denote by N = {1, 2, ..., n} a set of claimants each of whom has some claim
on an endowment E. The class of claims problems involving n agents and the class
of all claims problems are denoted by Dn and D, respectively. i.e D = ∪N∈ηDN
where η is the set of all non-empty subsets of N where it denotes natural numbers.
Definition 7. An n-tuple vector x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) is said to be a solution to or
an allocation for the claims problem (E; d) if
i) 0 ≤ xi ≤ di for all i ∈ N ,
ii)
∑
i∈N xi = E.
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Here, xi is interpreted as claimant i’s share from E. Let’s denote the family
of allocations for a given claims problem (E; d) by A(E; d).
Definition 8. (Bankruptcy Rule) A bankruptcy rule φ : D → ∪N∈ηRN+ is a
function that maps each each claims problem to an allocation.
Definition 9. (Proportional Rule) For each (E; d) ∈ D, PROP (E; d) ≡ (E. di∑
j∈N dj
)ni=1
Definition 10. (Anonymity) A rule φ satisfies anonymity if for each (E; d) ∈ D,
each π ∈ ΠN and each i ∈ N , φπ(i)((E; dπ(i)) = φi(E; d) where ΠN denotes the
class of bijections from N into itself.
Definition 11. (Claims Continuity) A rule φ satisfies claims continuity if for
each sequence {(Ev; dv)}∞v=1 of elements of Dn and each (E; d) ∈ Dn, if(Ev; dv)→
(E; d) and for each v ∈ N Ev = E, then φ(Ev; dv)→ φ(Ev; dv).
Definition 12. (Union−consistency) A rule φ is said to be union−consistent














In a sense, union consistency requires fairness among all subgroups. The
intuition is that some group of claimants may appeal to court claiming that some
other group is favoured against them. From a different perspective, addition of
new claimants and extra endowment for the new claimants should not favour one
group over the other.
Proposition 1. PROP is the only rule that satisfies both anonymity, union-
consistency and continuity.
Proof. (Sufficiency) PROP is trivially anonymous. For union−consistency,
consider an arbitrary (E; d) ∈ D. For any S1, S2 with S1∩S2 = ∅, S1, S2 6= ∅ and
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(Necessity) On the contrary, let R satisfy continuity and union−consistency.
Assume that
∑
i∈N di is rational and there exists a rational dj for some j ∈ N.
For an arbitrary (E; d), consider the following 3 problems;



























Notice that iii) is well defined due to our assumption.(By anonymity, we can
















































⇒ k = a/b
1/b.d
= a.d ∈ Z+ and
M = c/d
1/b.d
= c.b ∈ Z+. i.e. we have a positive integer number of claimants. How-
ever, if either di is irrational for all i ∈ N or
∑
i∈N di is irrational, then this is
not necessarily the case.)

















, we have by union−consistency,





























i∈N di or each di be irrational. Either case, we have at least




j∈N such that d
v
j is
rational and dvj → dj where dj is irrational. We also have d → d∗ ⇔ di → d∗i
for each i ∈ N. Let (E; dv) be sequence of claims problems with dvi ∈ Q for
i = 1, 2, ..., N and v = 1, 2, ... and (E; dv) → (E; d). Since R is union-consistent
and continuous, we have R(E; dv) = PROP (E; dv) and limdv→d PROP (E; d
v) =
limdv→dR(E; d
v) = R(E; d) = PROP (E; d) as PROP is continuous.
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Chapter 3
Risk Averse Investors Behavior
towards a Risky Firm
We extend the investment game which was first suggested in Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs
(2013). In the model, there is an arbitrary number of agents each of which is
endowed with a Constant-Absolute Risk Aversion(CARA) utility function. The
agents are presented the opportunity to invest in a risky project whose outcome
will either be success or be failure based on a Bernoulli Distribution function.
In case of a failure, total value of the investment is allocated among the agents
according to a bankruptcy rule. Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) compare 4 most common
rules in the literature whereas we relax the assumption that no agent can receive
more than his investment, in case of a failure. By doing so, we are allowing
the agents to receive amounts which are not possible under standard bankruptcy
rules. Hence, we are looking for optimality in a larger set of possible payoffs.
In real world situations, there are different types of agents some of which can
receive gains on investment even in the case of a failure. For instance, as opposed
to shareholders, some creditors may receive more than what they put in. In that
sense, our model can be considered as a better approximation to reality. We
also drop the assumption that each agent will receive a constant interest rate in
case of a success. Our aim is to account for all possible bankruptcy rules, and
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even other allocations which do not adhere to properties that are imposed by
bankruptcy rules, and to determine the optimal allocation a social planner would
choose without violating the individual rationality constraints. We first show
that only the total amount of investment matters, i.e. as long as the level of total
investment is the same, how much each investor contributes has no influence on
welfare and proceed to show that the optimal allocation can be obtained via a
free-market mechanism in which agents can trade payments in different states of
the world. We also show that no matter which rule is announced by the social
planner, the optimal amount of total investment is equal to the amount which
also emerges from the competitive game that utilises the proportional rule.
Following the main idea of Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) we investigate the Pareto
Optimal allocations regarding a joint venture(risky firm).
3.1 The Setting of Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013)
Denote the set of investors/agents by N = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent i’s preferences
are represented by a constant-absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function
ui : <+ → < where ui(x) = −e−aix. Here, ai is agent i’s risk-aversion constant
and their analysis relies on the assumption that ai > 0 ∀i ∈ N, that is, the
agents are risk averse. Also, a1 ≤ ... ≤ an without loss of generality.
There is a risky firm whose ex-ante value is determined by the total value of
investments made by the agents.i.e.,
∑
i
si where si is the investment of agent
i. Furthermore, agents choose their investments si ∈ <+ simultaneously. They
borrow from an outside market and the interest rate is normalized to 0. There
are 2 states of the world: with probability p ∈ (0, 1) the firm succeeds and the
total value of the firm becomes (1 + r)
∑
i si and with (1− p) probability it fails
and the total value shrinks to β
∑
i
si. It is assumed that r > 0 and 0 < β < 1.
After the realization of the state of the world, the total value is to be distributed
among the agents.
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The division method used at this point might capture some desirable proper-
ties. For example:
1. Given the method, this competitive game might lead to a Pareto Optimal
allocation in either the utilitarian sense or the egalitarian sense.
2. It might maximize the volume of investments.
Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) do not check for Pareto Optimality but rather com-
pare a limited subset of possible division methods evaluated according to util-
itarian and egalitarian welfare. While employing the same notions in order to
measure welfare, we consider the set of all possible allocations of the ex-post
total value and, therefore, characterize the Pareto optimal ones.
Moreover, the welfare levels in Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) concern only 2 agents
with equal Pareto weights (the latter is valid for utilitarian welfare).
Their definitions as they appear in their paper are as follows:
Definition 13 (Utilitarian Social Welfare). The utilitarian social welfare at the
Nash Equilibrium (NE, henceforth) of the 2 agent game induced by an allocation
rule F is given by;
UT F (p, r, β, a1, a2) = U
F
1 (ε(G
F )) + UF2 (ε(G
F ))
where the game GF is defined by the parameters (p, r, β, a1, a2), U
F
i (·) is agent i’s
utility and ε(GF ) is an equilibrium of the game.
Definition 14 (Egalitarian Social Welfare). The egalitarian social welfare at the
N.E. of the 2 agent-game induced by an allocation rule F is given by
EGF (p, r, β, a1, a2) = min
{
UF1 (ε(G
F ), UF2 (ε(G
F ))
}
where again the game GF is defined by the parameters (p, r, β, a1, a2) and ε(G
F ) is
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an equilibrium; it is the minimum utility an agent gets at an equilibrium induced
by F .
3.1.1 Common Allocation (Bankruptcy Rules)
Bankruptcy occurs in the state of the world where the value of output is β of the
initial investment, but Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) assume that in the other state
each agent gets the full return (1 + r) times their investment.
Definition 15 (Proportional Rule). For each i ∈ N , proi(s) = βsi where si
is the investment choice of agent i ∈ N and s is the investment vector.i.e. each
agent gets a proportion β of his claim where we equate ”claim” with the value of
the initial investment.
Definition 16 (Constrained Equal Losses). For each i ∈ N , CELi(s) = max {si − ϕ, 0}
where ϕ ∈ <+ satisfies
∑
i∈N max {si − ϕ, 0} = β
∑
i∈N si.
Note that in order to find equilibrium under CEA and CEL, Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs
first prove that not all combinations of parameters lead to a NE under CEL/CEA.
They then show that for the 2 agents case if there exists a NE it must be identical
to those of EL/EA respectively.where EL/EA are allocations such that agents
lose/receive the same amount.
Definition 17. For each i ∈ N , CEAi(s) = min {si, ϕ} where ϕ ∈ <+ satisfies∑
i∈N









≤ 0, then GamePROP
has a unique dominant strategy equilibrium (0, ..., 0). Otherwise, the game has a
unique dominant strategy equilibrium s∗ in which each agent i chooses a positive
investment level s∗i given by
s∗i =
1








We relax the assupmtion that no agent can receive more than his investment,
in case of a failure. We also drop the assumption that each agent will get an
interest rate of r, in case of success. Our aim is to determine the optimal allocation
social planner (S.P. hereafter) chooses without violating the individual rationality
constraints.
Therefore, we first present the social planner problem for the 2 agent case
without imposing the constraints F si ≥ 0 and F
f
i ≥ 0 where F si and F
f
i represent
player i’s shares in the case of success and failure respectively. We shall see that
they are not binding for a fairly large set of parameters.
We solve the problem in 2 steps for simplicity: First, we assume that agents’
investment levels (x1, x2) are given and find the allocations in the case of success
and failure as a function of them. Then, we see that what matters to the agents
is not the individual investments but rather the total investment. Then, we solve
the total utility maximization problem with respect to the total investment.


















F s1 + F
s
2 = (1 + r)(x1 + x2) (1)
and
F f1 + F
f
2 = β(x1 + x2). (2)
Alternatively, we can plug (1) and (2) in and solve the unconstrained problem
and if 0 ≤ F s1 ≤ (1 + r)(x1 + x2) and 0 ≤ F
f
1 ≤ β(x1 + x2) then the constraints
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F si ≥ 0 and F
f
i ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2 are not binding Then, the Lagrangian is;
L = λ1
[
















) + a2(1 + r)(x1 + x2)− a2x2 + a1x1
(a1 + a2)
,
F s2 = (1 + r)(x1 + x2)−
ln(a1λ1
a2λ2










F f2 = β(x1 + x2)− F
f
1 = β(x1 + x2)−
ln(a1λ1
a2λ2
) + a2β(x1 + x2)− a2x2 + a1x1
a1 + a2
.
This is the solution to the planner’s problem given x1 and x2. Now we consider

















































It is worth mentioning that x1 and x2 enter only through Ψ. The intuition that
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the production function is additive in their investments, and that the preferences
are quasi-linear –i.e. the fact that return/loss less investment, all goes inside the













































) · a1 + a2
a1 + a2(1− β + r)
for rp ≥ (1− p)(1− β)
0 otherwise
Ψ∗ is independent of λi as the quasi-linear structure implies that surplus is
maximised independently of λi but the Pareto weights determine the split of
surplus.
Note that Ψ∗is the total investment level in the two agent GamePr op. Intu-
itively, if the condition rp ≥ (1− p)(1− β) holds, on average the project yields a
nonnegative return, and when this is strict, a small positive investment will yield
a positive first-order gain, while the increase in variance will be second-order, so
investment must be positive.
Remark 1. One should notice that the P.O. allocation might yield utility levels
different from those of the competitive game under PROP. With 2 agents. For











must hold. Since the S.P. is concerned with sum of utilities, he exploits the fact
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that more risk-averse agents are more productive in the case of success and vice
versa
In order to have a feasible allocation, no agent should receive a negative pay-
ment in any state of the world. The allocation is feasible if it satisfies the follow-
ing:
1. 0 ≤ F s1 ≤ (1 + r)Ψ,
2. F s1 + F
s
2 = (1 + r)Ψ,
3. 0 ≤ F f1 ≤ βΨ
4. F f1 + F
f
2 = βΨ
One can check that the four conditions above hold for a very large portion of
the parameter space.
Proposition 3. If there are N agents playing the investment game and the
S.P.chooses investment levels as well as the allocations in both states of the
world by respecting the individual rationality constraints, then the total invest-







1− β + r
i.e. the level of investment underGamePROP is preserved. However, depending on
the S.P.’s preferences, PROP is not th only P.O allocation. Moreover, individual
levels of investment do not matter.




























i xi and F
j
i ≥ 0, j = s, f. For all
i ∈ N, the last set of constraints, however, might not be binding. Therefore, we
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ignore them at this point and check whether the condition is satisfied after the
maximization.
Solving for the first order conditions, we find:












































As in the two agent case, the utilities depend on Ψ =
∑
i xi and not on
individual investments levels.














































1− β + r
which is equal to the total value of investments in the proportional game.
Note: Notice that if pr < (1 − p)(1 − β) then Ψ∗ is not determined. This is
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because the investment will have a negative expected value in this case and it is
optimal not to invest anything at all.
Since the agents are borrowing from outside, S.P. only decides how much
each agent will lose or gain. The payment scheme depends on the individual
investment so that the earnings don’t depend on individual investments but on
the sum of investments. (Moreover, there are no externalities in GamePROP so
the S.P. is effectively maximizing each agent’s utility separately, that’s why our
result holds and Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) find a dominant strategy equilibrium).
Proposition 4. Among the class of bankruptcy rules, PROP is P.O, but it is
not unique.
Another important issue is whether PROP. is a P.O. rule and whether it is
unique. In order to see if that‘s the case, we are going to consider all possible
allocation schemes in the case of a failure. i.e. we will not be interested in how
the agents share the surplus in the case of success as in that scenario there is
going to be a higher income to share than the amount invested in the venture.
Translating this to the language of bankruptcy, the endowment to be distributed
will exceed the sum of the claims, hence it will be possible to jointly honour all
the claims. Nevertheless, we need to make an assumption on how the success
profits will be divided since agents’ utilities also depend on this variable. One
may expect to see different levels of losses for each agent depending on what the
S.P. assigns to each of them in the case of success. Since we have assumed that
the production technology is quasi-linear, we may start by assuming that each
agent will receive a profit equal to ”r” portion of her investment. In other words,
we are going to impose proportional allocation of gains. If we do so, however,
we can intuitively anticipate proportional division in the case of failure as the
ability of S.P. to allocate will be limited to the failure event. i.e. even if one of
the agents promise a higher marginal utility than the other if the S.P. transfers
an infinitesimal unit from the latter to the former when the venture is successful
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and vice versa in the failure case, since transfers in the case of success won‘t
be allowed, an allocaton different than PROP. might lead to a marginal utility
discrepancy. Thus, it appears to be reasonable to predict that the S.P. will want
to make marginal utilities of agents match with each oter and choose proportional
allocation as the utilities are CARA.
One other thing is that the feasibility restrictions have to be tightened up.
Instead of requiring that no agent receives more than what’s available in the
case of success, we confine each agent’s maximum earning to a proportion of her
investment. The constraints defined for the failure case, however, will remain the










F f1 + F
f
2 = β(x1 + x2) (1)
and
0 ≤ F f1 ≤ β(x1 + x2). (2)
Plugging F f2 = β(x1 + x2)− F
f
1 in the equation, we write the Lagrangian:
L = λ1[−p.e−a1rx1 + (1− p)(−e−a1(F
f
1 −x1)] +





1 + µ2(β(x1 + x2)− F
f
1 )




1 −x1) − a2λ2(1− p)e
−a2(β(x1+x2)−F f1 −x2) + µ1 − µ2 = 0 (1)
µ1F
f
1 = 0 (2)
µ2(β(x1 + x2)− F f1 ) = 0 (3)
−F f1 ≤ 0 (4)
F f1 − β(x1 + x2) ≤ 0 (5)
µ1, µ2 ≤ 0 (6)
Then; from (2) and (3), one of the following must hold;
µ1 = µ2 = 0 (1)
β(x1 + x2)− F f1 = µ1 = 0 (2)
β(x1 + x2)− F f1 = F
f
1 = 0 (3)
F f1 = µ2 = 0 (4)
(3) can be satisfied only if the S.P. decides to make no investment at all. Since it
may occur only depending on the parameters of the production technology and
once we have such parameters, there is not going to be any investment regardless
of the risk aversion coefficients or the allocation rule used.Therefore, we rule out
(3). If (2) or (4) holds, then we have a corner solution and the S.P.allocates all
the remaining endowment to the first agent in case (2), and to the second agent
in case (4). Since we have fixed the returns in the success case and for each agent
the return cannot be greater than her investment, as there is the risk losing all the
investment, it yields negative expected returns for one of the agents and violates
individual rationality. With such a rule, regardless of whether the S.P. chooses
the investment levels or the agents do, the optimal(or the chosen) investment
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would be 0 for one of the agents. (Actually, it would be 0 for the more risk averse
investor) Hence, we have µ1 = µ2 = 0. Plugging µ1 = µ2 = 0 in (1) and solving




) + a2β(x1 + x2)− a2x2 + a1x1
a1 + a2
which is the same equation we found without fixing the success returns. The
reason is that the S.P. treats the two different events separately. Above equation
also shows that one can find λ1, λ2 such that PROP. is a P.O. rule but it is not
unique.
Note that the same result also applies to the case with an arbitrary number
of agents.
3.2.3 Difficulties in Applying the P.O. Allocation
In order to apply the P.O. outcome in this setting, the S.P. has to have complete
knowledge about the agents’ preferences over the lotteries generated by this risky
venture. In a realistic marketplace where there are several potential investors, it
is too optimistic to say that it is a realistic assumption. Therefore, in order to
apply these levels of investments and allocations, the S.P. has to come up with a
mechanism which will reveal the preferences correctly.
A solution to this problem might be a free market mechanism where agents
can trade their potential gains and potential losses. Since at a given allocation, it
is possible to see different marginal utilities, even each agent is receiving exactly
the same payments in each state of the world, agents with different risk attitudes
might benefit from such trade.
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3.2.4 Trading the Different Payments in Different States
of the World
Once the investment levels and the corresponding allocation scheme is deter-
mined, all agents know how much they are going to be paid in two different
outcomes. Regarding the type of utility functions they have, one can view them
as traders in a marketplace with two goods as endowment: the payment in the
case of “success” and the payment in the case of “failure”. Once these two are
allowed to be exchanged, we will end up with a pure exchange economy after the
allocation is determined. Hence, we will be able to apply two renowned theorems
in order to justife this method.
Definition 18. ( Pure Exchange Economy) A pure exchange economy ε
with consumption space X and set of agents N, is
ε = {ei,i}i∈N , where ei ∈ X and  ∈ X × X denote the agent i’s initial
endownment and preferences, respectively.
Theorem 3. ( First Theorem of Welfare Economics) For any exchange
economy ε, where agents preferences are given by continuous, complete, preorders
satisfying local non-satiation CE(E) ⊆PO(E).
Definition 19. ( Local Non-Satiation) A preference relation  ∈ X×X is locally
non-satiated if for all x ∈ X and all ε > 0 there exists y ∈ X with ‖y − x‖ < ε
and y  x.
Since the agents in our setting have monotonic prefrences and local non-
satiation is implied by monotonicity, one of the requirements to be able to apply
the theorem is automatically satisfied.
Theorem 4. ( Social Planner’s Problem and Pareto Weights) If every agent i’s
preferences are represented by a continuous, strictly increasing and concave utility
function ui : X → <(0 ∈ X), and ei >> 0 then an allocation x∗ ∈ Xn is P.O. if
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and only if there exists θ∗ ∈ ∆(N) and x∗ solves the social planner’s problem for





It is easy to verify that u
i
(.) is continuous and strictly increasing in both
arguments.Thus, it is enough to check for concavity.
Theorem 5. (Checking for Concavity) A twice continuously differentiable func-
tion f is concave if the Hessian matrix H(x) is negative semi-definite at all points
x.





Where the endownments in the case of “success” and “failure” are denoted
by s and f, respectively.
Since the eigenvalues are all negative and the utility functions are concave,
then we conclude that the preferences satisfy the desired properties and, thus,
the theorems hold. As a result, the price mechanism is efficient and will correct
any error the S.P. makes when allocating the liquidated firm.
3.3 Conclusion
The model presented in Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) does not account for some of
the situations which occur in real life. Namely, they do not allow for any investor
to receive more than her claim. Moreover, they conduct their analysis for only
the 4 most common rules in the literature. However, these are the most favoured
rules in the literature. All of them are studied and suggested by various authors
on both axiomatic and game theoretic grounds. In order to adopt a more realistic
approach to risky investments, we assume that investors’ possible gains are not
determined by individual contributions. Yet, we assume the same sort of utility
function which is also used in the analysis of Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013). This
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leads to the result that the socially optimal level of welfare is not dependent
on individual levels of investment, although the investors have different attitudes
towards risk. We get this result by exploiting the fact that the production function
is additive in investors’ contributions and that the preferences are quasi-linear.
On a modified version of the model, we impose that each agent‘s profit is a
fixed fraction of her investment in the case of success. On the other hand, we leave
the constraints for the failure case unchanged and solve the S.P.‘s problem. By
doing so, not only do we show that PROP. is P.O. among the class of bankruptcy
rules but we also establish that it is a P.O. way of distributing the ex-post welfare
even if the S.P. is not restricted to give each agent at most as much as she
invests. This may explain why PROP. is also used in real ventures. However,
it is noteworthy that PROP. is not the only P.O. way of allocation. In fact, we
have an abundance of P.O. allocations. Moreover, since different risk aversion
coefficients require different Pareto weights, given the Pareto weights of the S.P.,
a different allocation needs to be chosen since no allocation is P.O. for all levels
of risk-aversion.
In that case, S.P. encounters the problem of having incomplete information
about agents‘ preferences. In order to cope with the problem, we suggest a
market mechanism where agents can trade their potential gains and potential
losses. freely. By making use of some well-known results, we conclude that the
mechanism ends up with a P.O. allocation.
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